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ORIGINALISM AND THE 
DESEGREGATION DECISIONS-A 
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR McCONNELL 
Earl M. Maltz* 
In Originalism and the Desegregation Decisionsi Professor 
Michael W. McConnell makes a bold effort to justify Brown v. 
Board of Education2 in terms of originalist theory. Unlike com-
mentators who have previously dealt with this issue, Professor 
McConnell does not focus his primary attention on the period 
from 1866 to 1868-the time in which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself was drafted and ratified. Rather, he argues that the 
treatment of Sen. Charles Sumner's Civil Rights Bill in the 1870s 
suggests that at that time Republicans generally believed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment outlawed segregated schools. He fur-
ther maintains that Republican attitudes in the 1870s should be 
considered authoritative evidence of the original understanding. 
The article bears many of the characteristics that have made 
Professor McConnell one of our leading constitutional scholars. 
Meticulously researched and carefully argued, the article adds 
greatly to our understanding of the doctrinal arguments that sur-
rounded the desegregation issue in the 1870s, as well as the polit-
ical dynamic that resulted in the elimination of the school-related 
provisions from the Civil Rights Act of 1875.3 Unfortunately, 
however, Professor McConnell fails in his attempt to demon-
strate that the decision in Brown is consistent with the original 
understanding. 
Refutation of Professor McConnell's argument is a two step 
process. The first step is to explain why congressional treatment 
of the school desegregation issue in the 1870s does not demon-
strate that the original understanding was that the Fourteenth 
Amendment outlawed school desegregation. The second step is 
to show that other historical evidence indicates that the framers 
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). 
I. 81 Va. L. Rev. 947 ( 1995). 
2. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
3. 183 Stat. 335 (1875). 
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did not believe that they were forbidding states from maintaining 
segregated schools. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL TREATMENT OF SUMNER'S 
CIVIL RIGHTS BILL DOES NOT NECESSARILY 
SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT BROWN 
WAS RIGHTLY DECIDED 
The use of the congressional treatment of Sumner's Civil 
Rights Bill to support Brown in originalist terms faces two sepa-
rate problems. The first problem is doctrinal: while Brown dealt 
with the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment per se on school 
segregation, the issue in the debate on the Civil Rights Act was 
whether Congress had the power to require public schools to be 
desegregated. The second problem is temporal: the Civil Rights 
Act was not considered and adopted until several years after the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and political conditions had 
changed substantially in the interim. 
THE DOCTRINAL PROBLEM 
The constitutional issue that was debated in the 1870s was 
whether Congress had the power to order school desegregation 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This question is 
analytically distinct from that of whether Section 1 by its terms 
requires desegregation (although the two issues obviously are re-
lated). Moreover, there is substantial reason to believe that at 
least some Republicans understood this distinction and knew 
that they were dealing only with the Section 5 issue. 
As Professor McConnell notes, Republican Rep. William 
Lawrence of Ohio enunciated the basic constitutional theory un-
derlying the provisions of the Civil Rights Bill that dealt with 
schools. Lawrence argued that "[w]hen the States by law create 
and protect, and by taxation on the property of all support, be-
nevolent institutions designed to care for those who need their 
benefits, the dictates of humanity require that equal provision 
should be made for all."4 This theory-also cited by Republican 
Senators Oliver H. P. T. Morton and John Sherman as the justifi-
cation for including public education in the Civil Rights Bills-
draws its support from antebellum legal authorities defining the 
scope of the right to protection of the laws. In relevant part, 
these authorities did not rely on either a particular distaste for 
4. 2 Con g. Rec. 412 ( 1874). 
5. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong .. 2d Sess. 3190-93 (1872). 
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racial classifications or an assessment of the importance of partic-
ular government benefits. Rather, they were based on the view 
that where a class of people was taxed to support a given benefit 
and then denied access to that benefit, that class was, in essence, 
subject to an uncompensated taking and, as such, denied the 
right to protection from government.6 
This doctrine played an important role in the 1860 Senate 
debate over the funding of education in the District of Columbia. 
As initially proposed, the bill before the Senate provided simply 
that the city authorities could impose a general property tax to 
benefit the public schools in the District and that the federal gov-
ernment would provide matching funds of up to $25,000 per year. 
Senate Republicans pressed for an amendment that would have 
required the city government to use at least part of the funds to 
educate blacks as well as whites. One of the mainstays of the 
Republican argument was the contention that "taxing [blacks] to 
support schools for the exclusive benefit of the white children ... 
would be a kind of legal robbery"?-a clear reference to the prin-
ciples of the state taxation cases. At the same time, however, the 
limitations of the doctrine became clear when Republican Daniel 
Clark, the sponsor of the amendment to require that blacks be 
admitted to the schools, stated that he would accept exclusion of 
free blacks so long as they were exempted from the property tax 
and their pro rata share of the federal contribution was 
withheld.B 
John Sherman, one of the most prominent Republicans in 
the Senate, took a similarly limited view of the scope of the right 
protected. In 1872, Sherman stated that he viewed the mainte-
nance of segregated schools as constitutional, so long as the black 
schools received their pro rata share of school funding.9 Yet, the 
next day, Sherman voted against the Blair amendment, which 
would have specifically reserved to local governments the right to 
maintain segregated schools.w How can one explain this seem-
ing anomaly? 
The simplest answer lies in the Republican conception of the 
scope of the Section 5 enforcement authority. Many regular 
Republicans embraced the view of congressional power ex-
pressed by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Mary-
6. The development of this theory is described in detail in Earl M. Maltz, Four-
teenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am. 1. Legal Hist. 305 (1988). 
7. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1681 (1860). 
8. Id. at 1680. 
9. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong .. 2d Sess. 3193 (1872). 
10. Id. at 3263. 
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land: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitu-
tion, are constitutionai."n Under this view, Congress clearly 
would have authority to prohibit some actions that would not be 
prohibited by the Constitution itself. This point was made by 
Republicans a number of times in the debate over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875. Thus, for example, Rep. Robert Hale of New 
York explicitly relied on McCulloch in arguing that passage of 
the Civil Rights Act would not be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's decision in The Slaughter-House Cases.12 Lawrence also 
relied on McCulloch in his defense of the Civil Rights Bill, de-
claring that "Congress ... is the exclusive judge of the proper 
means to employ" in guaranteeing the rights secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendmentt3 and that "[a] remedial power in the 
Constitution is to be construed liberally."t4 
Against this background, the apparent inconsistencies in 
Sherman's position can be reconciled. School segregation might 
not be unconstitutional per se; however, the Civil Rights Bill 
might still be constitutional under the McCulloch view of con-
gressional power as a device to guarantee that blacks would in 
fact receive equal financial support in return for their tax dollars 
or (as Sherman apparently believed) as a means to advance the 
Reconstruction process generally.1s In neither case would a vote 
for the school desegregation provisions of the Civil Rights Bill 
support the conclusion that Brown was rightly decided under 
originalist theory. 
Of course, as Professor McConnell clearly demonstrates, a 
number of Republicans disagreed with Sherman and argued that 
Section 1 by its terms outlawed school segregation. Even those 
statements, however, are suspect from an originalist perspective. 
Republican pronouncements on constitutional issues in the 1870s 
are a demonstrably unreliable guide to the original understand-
ing in the period from 1866 to 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was drafted and ratified. 
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819). 
12. 3 Cong. Rec. 980 (1875), discussing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 
(1872). 
13. 2 Cong. Rec. 414 (1874). 
14. ld. at 412, citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476 (1793). 
15. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3192-93 (1872). 
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THE TEMPORAL PROBLEM 
As Reconstruction progressed, regular Republicans showed 
a clear willingness to move beyond the strictures of the Four-
teenth Amendment in adopting civil rights measures of nation-
wide applicability. In pure policy terms, the evolution of the 
Republican position on the issue of black suffrage provides one 
striking example. During the drafting of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself, party regulars explicitly rejected a provision that 
would have required the states to allow blacks to vote; moreover, 
they specifically noted their rejection of the black suffrage provi-
sion in the committee report accompanying the proposed amend-
ment.t6 Only three years later, by contrast, Republicans united 
to pass the Fifteenth Amendment, which required states to adopt 
race-blind qualifications for voting. 
For purposes of evaluating Professor McConnell's argument, 
the evolution of the Republican position on jury service is even 
more compelling. A section prohibiting racial discrimination in 
jury selection was included in the Civil Rights Act of 1875,t7 with 
Republicans citing the equal protection clause as the source of 
authority for this provision.tR Moreover, Republican support for 
the jury selection provision was no less overwhelming than the 
support for the school provisions; for example, in 1872, an effort 
to delete the protection for jury service from the Sumner bill was 
defeated 33-16; among Republicans, only James L. Alcorn of 
Mississippi, Arthur I. Boreman of West Virginia, Matthew H. 
Carpenter of Wisconsin, and John A. Logan of Illinois supported 
the motion.t9 
Given this background, the same argument that supports 
Professor McConnell's position on the issue of racially segre-
gated schools would also suggest that, as originally understood by 
its framers, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from 
excluding free blacks from juries. However, a wide variety of 
commentators, including Professor McConnell himself, have con-
cluded that in the late 1860s it was generally conceded by all par-
ties that the Fourteenth Amendment had no impact on political 
16. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. xiii 
(1866). 
17. 183 Stat. 335 (1875). 
18. The evolution of the jury selection provision is described in detail in Earl M. 
Maltz, The Civil Rights Act and the Civil Rights Cases: Congress, Court, and Constitution, 
44 Fla. L. Rev. 605, 623-26 (1992). 
19. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3263 (1872). 
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rights, including the right to serve on juries.zo Thus, the jury ser-
vice provision stands as a clear example of a case in which regu-
lar Republicans of the 1870s were willing to seize on the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a source of authority for congres-
sional action that went beyond the original understanding of the 
Amendment. There is no particular reason to believe that the 
school desegregation provision would have stood on any more 
secure footing. 
Despite these problems, if the discussions of Sumner's Civil 
Rights Bill were the only available evidence, one might well 
conclude that Brown was defensible in originalist terms. A 
variety of other evidence, however, suggests strongly that segre-
gated schools would have been permitted under the original 
understanding. 
II. THE ORIGINALIST CASE AGAINST BROWN 
The originalist case against Brown rests on two different ar-
guments. First, a direct constitutional attack on segregated 
schools was unthinkable in the period in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment was drafted, passed, and ratified. Second, the doc-
trinal structure of Section 1 is inconsistent with the view that it 
was originally understood to prohibit the maintenance of segre-
gated schools. 
SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
As Professor McConnell notes, school segregation was com-
mon in the Northern states during the period in which the Four-
teenth Amendment was drafted and ratified. Segregation was 
particularly prevalent in the states of the lower North-the piv-
otal battleground states in the national elections. Thus, any di-
rect, broad-based effort to attack segregated schools would have 
carried with it substantial political risks. 
The moderate Republicans who controlled the drafting of 
the Fourteenth Amendment were disinclined to take such risks. 
The amendment was in large measure a campaign document, 
designed to outline the Republican program of Reconstruction 
for the upcoming elections of 1866.21 As such, all of its provi-
sions-including Section 1-were carefully drafted to appeal to 
20. McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 1024 (cited in note 1). See also Maltz, 44 Fla. L. 
Rev. at 623-26 (cited in note 18). 
21. The political maneuvering surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is described in detail in Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle: Congres-
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swing voters in the post-Civil War electorate. As part of their 
strategy, mainstream Republicans repeatedly assured those vot-
ers that Section 1 would have only a minimal impact on Northern 
state laws-a claim they could not make if Section 1 had been 
generally understood to outlaw segregated schools. 
The congressional treatment of the District of Columbia 
school system underscores the unwillingness of Republicans in 
the 39th Congress to attack school segregation. Issues of federal-
ism did not constrain congressional action dealing with the Dis-
trict of Columbia; thus, on issues such as streetcar segregation, 
voting rights, and jury service, mainstream Republicans in Con-
gress acted to protect the rights of free blacks in the District well 
in advance of the passage of nationally applicable measures. By 
contrast, contemporaneously with the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the same Republicans continued to support the segregated 
school system in the District of Columbia.zz To contend that 
Republicans would at the same time knowingly act against school 
segregation by a nationally applicable constitutional amendment 
is to attribute to them an almost Orwellian mentality. 
In short, contextual evidence strongly suggests that the fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not believe that they were 
outlawing segregation in public schools. In theory, however, they 
might have inadvertently adopted language that would have 
made such segregation illegal under then-applicable rules of legal 
interpretation. Thus, the originalist case against Brown ulti-
mately depends on a doctrinal analysis of Section 1. 
THE DOCTRINAL ARGUMENT 
As Professor McConnell correctly observes, the critical doc-
trinal question is whether the privileges or immunities clause of 
Section 1 would have been understood to prohibit the mainte-
nance of segregated schools.zJ By its terms, this provision does 
not outlaw discrimination of any particular type; instead, it de-
fines a set of rights that are brought under federal protection by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the very least, states are prohib-
ited from using race as a criterion for limiting those rights. 
In defining the scope of the privileges or immunities clause, 
Professor McConnell focuses his attention on the Reconstruc-
tion-era distinction between civil rights, which were protected by 
sional Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863-1869, (W.W. Norton, 1974); Eric McKitrick, 
Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (U. of Chicago Press, 1960). 
22. E.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 708-09 (1866). 
23. McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 998-1005 (cited in note 1). 
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the privileges or immunities clause, and social and political 
rights, which were outside the coverage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.24 These terms did, indeed, figure prominently in 
the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 186(}2s and the Four-
teenth Amendment itself. However, Professor McConnell fails 
to note that another dichotomy was also critical in the Republi-
can taxonomy of rights-the distinction between rights inherent 
in national citizenship and "local" rights, which were creatures of 
state law. 
A number of prominent Republicans in the 39th Congress 
drew clear distinctions between the two sets of rights; for exam-
ple, Rep. William Lawrence of Ohio declared that "all privileges 
and immunities are of two kinds, to wit, those which [are] inher-
ent in every citizen of the United States, and such others as may 
be conferred by local law and pertain only to the citizen of the 
State."26 The same distinction is reflected in the structure of the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself. Section 1 refers to both state citi-
zenship and national citizenship; the privileges or immunities 
clause, by contrast, protects only those rights associated with na-
tional citizenship-in other words "those which [are] inherent in 
every citizen of the United States," rather than simply "conferred 
by locallaw."z7 
Even when considered in the abstract, the right to a free 
public education fits comfortably into the mold of a right "con-
ferred by local law and pertain[ing] only to the citizen of the 
State. "zs Unlike, for example, the right to contract and to be free 
from bodily restraint, it cannot be viewed as a natural right which 
preexisted the establishment of governments. Unlike the right to 
hold real property, it is not the byproduct of allegiance to a fed-
eral government with sovereign authority. Instead, public educa-
tion is a creation of state government, supported by the local 
taxation for the benefit of its own citizenry. As such, access to 
public education is the quintessential example of a right depen-
dent on state rather than national citizenship and is thus outside 
the protection of the privileges or immunities clause. 
This conclusion is bolstered by the status of public education 
under the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV -the 
comity clause. John A. Bingham, the author of Section 1, explic-
24. Id. at 1014-29. 
25. 14 Stat. 27 (1866 ). 
26. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866). See also, e.g., id. at 600 (re-
marks of Sen. Trumbull); id. at app. 293 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). 
27. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866). 
28. ld. 
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itly identified the comity clause as the source of the privileges or 
immunities language and, differentiating between state and na-
tional citizenship, identified the rights protected as the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States.29 The identity be-
tween the comity clause and the privileges or immunities lan-
guage of Section 1 was recognized by many other mainstream 
Republicans as well.Jo 
Against this background, the proper analysis of the privi-
leges or immunities clause of Section 1 emerges rather clearly. 
The rights protected by the clause are rights of national citizen-
ship, which in turn are identical with those that states must grant 
to sojourners from other states under the comity clause. While 
the nature of these rights might be unclear at the margins, the 
right to attend public schools is rather clearly not included. Few 
(if any) constitutional scholars would claim that a child from 
state A, visiting for one week in state B, would have a right 
under the comity clause to attend the public schools of state B 
during his visit. Thus, since the rights guaranteed by the two 
privileges and immunities clauses were understood to be coex-
tensive, citizens of state B similarly cannot claim the right to at-
tend desegregated schools under the privileges or immunities 
clause of Section 1. 
In short, both the historical context and the doctrinal struc-
ture of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment work against 
Professor McConnell's effort to defend Brown in originalist 
terms. Admittedly, by 1875 (or even by 1872) a substantial 
number of Republicans who had voted in favor of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may have honestly believed that the Constitution 
outlawed racially-segregated schools. However, the weight of 
the historical evidence indicates that those who drafted and rati-
fied the Fourteenth Amendment did not share that understand-
ing during the earlier Reconstruction period. 
29. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158, 1034 (1866). 
30. Jd. at 1054 (remarks of Rep. Higby); id. at 1095 (remarks of Rep. Hotchkiss). 
While Bingham himself viewed the rights protected by the first eight amendments as pro-
tected by the comity clause as well, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871 ), Sen. 
Jacob Howard of Michigan argued that the privileges or immunities clause of Section 1 
protected them in addition to those rights protected by the comity clause. Cong. Globe, 
39th Cong, 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). Even if one were to adopt Howard's view, it would not 
materially change the analysis. 
